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THE FINALITY OF THE FILED RATE IN WEST VIRGINIA
TiaoAis P. HARDMAN
F EW propositions are better established at common law than
that a public utility may exact only a reasonable rate and that
a patron who has been compelled to pay more may maintain an
action for the overcharge.' The first part of this proposition has
been incorporated in almost so many words in our statute creat-
ing a public service commission and authorizing it to regulate
rates. 2 The second part of this common-law rule was not, however,
carried over in full into the statute, 3 and the question therefore
arises as to what remedy, if any, a patron may now pursue when
he has been required to pay an unreasonable charge. Does the
fact that the challenged rate has been filed with the commission
-and (1) approved, or (2) not disapproved-give it finality as
to all services which have been rendered in accordance with its
tenor?
At the outset it should be noted that the West Virginia stat-
ute, unlike the public service statutes of some states4 and unlike
the Interstate Commerce Act," does not empower the commission
to award reparation, i. e., to upset the rate retroactively and per-
mit a recovery of any provable overcharge.' Accordingly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals intimated in an early
case that the patron's remedy, if any, must be before the courts.7
But is there a judicial remedy? Does the administrative control
completely supersede the common-law control on all questions
involving the retroactive unreasonableness of the filed rate?
Basically the problem is, of course, one of statutory inter-
pretation in the interrelated fields of public utility law and admin-
Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
I West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 436, 27 S: Ct. 350,51 L. Ed. 553 (1907).5 W. VA. RzV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 3, § 1: "All charges, tolls and rates
shall be just and reasonable."
•3'W. Va. Rz. CoDE (1931) c. 24, art. 4, § 7, provides: "Any person, firm
or corporation claiming to be damaged by any violation of this chapter by any
public utility subjeet to the provisions of this chapter, may make complaint
to the Commission, as provided herein, and bring suit in his own behalf for
thq recovery of the damages for which such public utility may be liable under
this chapter in any circuit court having jurisdiction."
4 See e. g. ILL. REV. STATS. (1935) c. l1la, § 91; of. IND. STATs. ANN.
(Burns, 1926) § 12853.
49 U. S. C. A. § 16 (1) (1929).
6 See the provision of the West Virginia Code set out in footnote 3. Whether
this provision authorizes a judicial recovery of an overcharge is a question
discussed in the body of this article.
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istrative law. But what principle of construction governs the
measure of supervision which is, or should be, left to the courts
and to the administrative tribunal respectively ?
One of the earliest cases in point, and a leading authority, is
T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & Nashv.ille R. R.,s decided by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1922. The statute there in-
volved was somewhat more specific than the West Virginia stat-
ute, though otherwise similar in substance.9 The rate in ques-
tion had been filed with the appropriate administrative tribunal.
Apparently the commission had not formally approved the rate.
At least the evidence did not disclose the making of any formal
order of approval.1" In a court action for the difference between
the alleged reasonable rate and the filed rate it was held that the
filed rate whether reasonable or not was the only legal rate as to
the past and therefore there could be no recovery. Said the court:
"Mfanifestly there can be but one lawful rate in force at
any given time, and that rate.., is the rate which has been filed
with and approved by the Commission, and published by the
carrier. Behind that rate, so long as it remains unchanged,
and so far as its application to specific shipments is concerned
neither shipper nor carrier can go, and courts cannot inquire...
"It seems to us that this proposition is self-evident and
fundamental, and that it is the foundation of our regulatory
system, without which it would fail in its primary purposes,
which are to stabilize rates and charges, and to insure equality
to shippers in their application."I'
The general problem was presented to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia in 1927 in Matiieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk
& W. Ry.' 2 There the state commission had approved a rate which
7 See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 90 W. Va. 74, 79, 110
S. E. 498 (1922): "In fact, the jurisdiction and authority of the Public
Service Commission extends no further than to prescribe proper rates, and
proper practices, and to direct the public service corporations to comply with
them in the future." In the syllabus the court says: "The Public Service
Commission of Wb1est Virginia has no authority to entertain a complaint for
the purpose of determining that a public service corporation has charged
rates in excess of those authorized, when it appears that the rate which it is
contended was applicable, and which such corporation is charged with exceed-
ing, is no longer applicable to the service rendered, and the decision sought
could only be for the purpose of flning a basis for recovery of the amount
of the excessive charge."
8 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797 (1922).
9 The applicable statutory provisions are set out in T. R. Miller Mill Co.
v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., .sipra.
10 Id. at page 256.
1 Id. at page 256.
12 147 Va. 426, 137 S. E. 608 (1927).
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was filed and collected. In refusing to permit a retroactive up-
setting of the rate, the court said:
"The common law right to recover for extortionate charges
is taken care of under the Federal procedure by the power
granted the Connission to declare existing rates unreasonable
ab initio, and award reparation, followed by right of recovery
in the common law courts, (1:) while in Virginia the common
law rights are protected by the prescribing of rates by the Com-
mission, which carry the weight of conclusiveness as to their
reasonableness, as long as they are in force.(1
"There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the Fed-
eral law and the Virginia law with reference to the inaugura-
tion of rates, and we think the effect of the authority and
duties conferred and imposed upon the Corporation Commis-
sion here, is to give to legally established rates a sanction
which puts beyond question the reasonableness of such rates
as long as they remain in force."' 5
A very important but reverse angle of this question was raised
in Minneapolis, St. Paid, etc. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co."
In that case there was a legislatively-made rate which the utility
claimed deprived it of property without due process. The highest
court of the state held otherwise, and ordered enforcement.1 The
rate was filed and charged. The United States Supreme Court
later held that the filed rate which the carrier was being compelled
to apply deprived the utility of property without due process."
After the United States Supreme Court had so held, the utility
sued a patron to reco'.er the difference between the filed con-
fiscatory rate, which had been compulsorily collected, and a reason-
able rate. But, though the filed rate was unconstitutional and
therefore, in the ordinary language of the cases, "void", the court
held that the utility was not entitled to reparation. 9 The result
reached is undoubtedly correct. As the Supreme Court of North
Dakota said in disposing of the claim for reparation:
13 The power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to award reparation
has been otherwise indicated since this Virginia decision was handed down.
See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fd Ry., 284 U. S. 370,
52 S. Ct. 183, 76 L. Ed. 348 (1932).
14 Citing "C. & 0. Ry. v. C. V. L. Co., 112 Va. 540, 72 S. E. 116."
15 Mathieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 147 Va. 440-441, 137 S.
E. 608 (1927).
,6 40 N. Dak. 69, 168 N. W. 684 (1918).
17 State ex rel. M eCue v. Northern Pac. Ry., 26 N. Dak. 438, 145 N. W.
135 (1914).
Is See Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 35 S. Ct. 429, 59
L. Ed. 735 (1915).
19 Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 40 N. Dak.
69, 76, 168 N. W. 684 (1918).
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"Sections 4339-4342 of the Revised Codes . . .require,
among other things, that the carriers shall print and keep
for public inspection schedules showing the rates which are in
force at the given time, and they are required to file such
schedules with the Railroad Commission. Manifestly, if ship-
pers rely upoib the rates as so published and filed, the require-
ment of publication becomes a mere trap for the unwary."' 9
(Italics supplied.)
The United States Supreme Court, on writ of error to review
this judgment, rendered an opinion in which, after quoting the
italicized sentence of the above excerpt, it dismissed the writ of
error.
-2 0
Many other state courts, including the New York Court of
Appeals, 21 have arrived at substantially the same conclusion.22
In the federal system the cases are also in accord with respect
to "commission-approved" rtes,23 though these cases draw a dis-
tinction, not within the scope of the present discussion, with
respect to so-called "utility-made" rates. 24
A somewhat different result has been reached, however, in
some states.2 -- One of the most significant departures from the
general current of state authority is the Kansas case of State ex
rel. Boynton v. Public Service Commission.-  There the applicable
legislation empowered the commission to make reparation awards,
but the language of the statute was not altogether specific or clear.2 1
In interpreting the statute, the court in effect repudiated the oft-
asserted proposition that in the state systems all filed uncondi-
tional rates are to be regarded as "commission-approved' ".2 The
court there takes the position that where rates have been approved
by and filed with the commission after a heaing and a deliberate
determination reparation may not be had with reference thereto.
20 Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U. S.
370, 41 S. Ct. 140, 65 L. Ed. 310 (1920).
21 Purcell v. New York Central R. R., 268 N. Y. 164, 197 N. E. 182 (1935).
22 See, e. g.. E. L. Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 127 Miss. 48, 89 So. 782
(1921); Suburban Water Co. v. Borough of Oakmont, 268 Pa. 243, 110 Atl.
778 (1920); Missouri-Kansas & R. R. Co. of Texas v. Railroad Comm. of
Texas, 3 S. W. (2d) 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
23 See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atehison, Topeka & Santa F Ry., 284 U. S.
370, 52 S. Ct. 183, 76 L. Ed. 348 (1932).
4Ibid.
2., See, e. g., Bonfils v. Public Utilities Comm., 67 Colo. 563, 189 Pac. 775
(1920).
26135 Ran. 491, 11 P. (2a) 999 (1932).
27 The applicable statutory provisions are set out in full in the opinion
of the court.
28 For a common statement of this proposition see Hutcheson, J., in Eagle
Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443, 446 (C. C, A. 5th, 1931).
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But the court draws the distinction as to rates which have been
formally approved and those which have been filed and approved
without a formal hearing.
As to the former class of rates, namely, formally-approved
rates, the court said;
"... it seems clear that when a rate has been the subject
of a deliberate inquiry in which the carriers, the shippers and
the commission's own experts have participated, as well as any
and all other persons who cared to take a hand in it as the
statute provides and permits . . . any rate so prescribed by
the commission and put into effect by the carriers may be
confidently collected and retained by them as their very own,
without misgiving that at some future time a further hearing
of the commission may be had and more evidence taken and
a different conclusion reached, and those rates condemned as
unreasonable, and reparation certificates allowed for the dif-
ference between the rates which the commission did authorize
and the rates which it should have authorized."2 9
But as to the latter class of rates, the court had this, among
other things, to say:
"Where the only approval given such rates by the public
service commission was the merely perfunctory one required
to apprise the commission of their filing and to enable it to
secure proper supervision of them"
reparation may be had.30
The problem was first specifically presented to the West Vir-
ginia court in 1932 in Natural Gas Co. v. Sommerville.31 The
facts in the case, and the background, were as follows. In 1920
an admittedly valid forty-cent rate was authorized by the com-
mission, filed and put into effect. In 1922 the utility applied to
the commission for an increase from the existing rate of forty-
cents to a "step-up" scale of rates ranging from forty-five cents
to sixty cents. The application was resisted by certain interested
municipalities and persons. In 1923 the Public Service Com-
mission, after a hearing and investigation, refused to grant an
increase. In 1924 the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
order of the Public Service Commission and remanded the case
29 State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Service Comm., 135 Kan. 491, 504, 11
P. (2d) 999 (1932).
30 Id., quotation from point five of syllabus by the court.
5' 113 W. Va, 100, 166 S, E, 852 (1932).
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to the commission for such further investigation and order as
might be proper in the premises.82
After numerous negotiations the utility and the protestants,
on June 25, 1924, agreed in writing upon a settlement of the case.
The agreement contained the following terms and conditions
(among others) .
"The Company shall dismiss the pending case without
prejudice, and shall be allowed to file tariffs, putting into
effect the following rates ... said rates to be effective from the
meter readings beginning about the 15th day of June, 1924,
until the meter readings beginning about the 15th day of De-
cember, 1927, to-wit:
"52 cents per thousand cubic feet ... "
In purported compliance with these provisions the commis-
sion, on June 26, 1924, ordered:
"(1) That this case be, and the same is, hereby dismissed
without prejudice.
"(2) That the applicant, Natural Gas Company of West
Virginia, be, and it is, hereby authorized ind allowed to file
upon one day's notice to the public and to this Commission,
tariffs providing the rates for natural gas as set forth in said
agreement, and effective as therein stated." 33
The tariff fied in alleged accordance with this authorization
set out a fifty-two-cent rate and purported to cancel the prior tariff
which provided for the forty-cent rate. The filed tariff provid-
ing for the fifty-two-cent rate contained no time limitation; it
merely provided, in this regard, that the fifty-two-cent rate was
"effective from and after meter reading month of June, 1924".
The fifty-two-cent rate, promulgated, filed and published in
alleged compliance with the commission's order of June 26, 1924,
was charged and collected by the utility without protest on the
part of any consumer until August 14. 1931, when the interested
municipality instituted a proceeding against the utility before the
Public Service Commission for the purpose of an investigation of
the justness and reasonableness of the rates for natural gas charged
by the defendant.8 4 In the same proceeding, upon motion of the
complainants, it was asked that the utility be required to charge
3 2 Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v. Public Service Comm., 95 W. Va. 557, 121
S. E. 716 (1924).
3 See the court's summary of this order in Natural Gas Co. of W: Va. v.
Sommerville, 113 W. Va. 100, 102, 166 S. E. 852 (1932).
34 See City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co. of W. Va., Bulletin No. 128,
Public Service Commission of West Virginia, Case No. 2149.
6
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a forty-cent rate on the theory that the forty-cent rate had been
automatically restored after the meter readings of December, 1927.
Upon this motion for an interpretation of its order authorizing
the fifty-two-cent rate, the Public Service Commission handed
down an opinion in which it held that the West Virginia Public
Service Commission Act kept the authorized rate in force during
the period involved in this suit.5
A representative suit was brought, in a circuit court, seeking
reparation with respect to the filed fifty-two-cent rate. A writ
of prohibition was then prosecuted to prevent the trial court
from proceeding with the case on the ground that the relief sought
was administrative rather than judicial.3 6 In refusing the writ
the Supreme Court of Appeals said, among other things:
"The case involves a claim of reparation for alleged in-
juries. The solution will depend not upon whether the charges
were in excess of a reasonable rate but whether they were in
excess of the lawfully established rate."
'
13
Thereupon the case came on for further proceedings. The
trial court referred the matter to a special commissioner, directing
him to ascertain and report, among other matters, "as to what
would have been a fair and legal charge" by the utility in excess
of forty cents, if any, from December 15, 1927, to the institution
of the suit. Whereupon, in 1934, the plaintiffs sought, by pro-
hibition, to restrain the court and the commissioner from execut-
ing the order of reference in so far as it directed the ascertain-
ment of what would have been a fair and legal charge in excess
of the forty-cent rate, if any, during the period in question. The
writ was awarded.3 8  In disposing of the point thus raised the
court said,
,,... It is, of course, a well recognized principle that
when acting within its jurisdiction a trial court should not be
interfered with in the manner of resolving issues pending
before it; that if it commits error the same may be correct-
ed upon review by the appellate court. But even in a case
of which it has unquestioned jurisdiction, a trial court should
not be permitted to invoke a procedure involving great delay
and stupendous expense for the purpose of determining a
3r Ibid
3 Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v. Sommerville, 113 W. Va. 100, 166 S. E.
852 (1932).
3T Id. at 105.
38 Wilson et a?. v. Brennan et a7., 114 W. Va. 777, 174 S. E. 696 (1934).
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matter not within its primary jurisdiction, or necessary to
a decision of the pertinent issues.
"Being of opinion that the proposed investigation and
determination of reasonable rates is not within the compe-
tency of the court, the writ will be awarded." 39
What then is the effect of these West- Virginia decisions?
Is the net result that in this state all filed unconditional rates are
to be regarded as final with respect to the question of their retro-
active unreasonableness?
Since the West Virginia decisions were handed down, this
same general question was presented to the highest court of New
York under legislation not unlike the West Virginia statute.4
In New York as in West Virginia the public service commission
has no power to award reparation with respect to alleged over-
charges made in accordance with the filed rate.41 Yet the court
held that there was no judicial remedy. In arriving at this con-
clusion the court said:
"The statute creating the Public Service Commission
and empowering it to supervise rates and charges was in-
tended to cover the whole subject of rates and supersede all
common law remedies. As long as the charges enforced are
those on file with the Commission, they are the only lawful
charges which may be collected. No departure from the filed
rates is permitted.
"The Legislature has provided a means for the protec-
tion of shippers against unreasonable rates. The action at
law resulted in different rates for different shippers dependent
upon the opinion of juries as to what was reasonable. The
statute makes the specified rate as fixed uniform and lawful
until changed by or with the permission of the Commission." 2
This conclusion, and the reasons assigned therefor, seem
equally applicable to the West Virginia statutory setup. To these
reasons may be added the following which have been set forth con-
vincingly by a federal court 43 with respect to the retroactive finality
of a filed "commission-approved" rate:
". .... Assume, for instance, a railroad whose earnings
largely depend upon one commodity. A coal-carrying road
is an apt illustration. The revenues of this road depend
39 At page 780.
40 Purcell v. New York Central R. R., 268 N. Y. 164, 197 N. E. 182 (1935).
41 !bid.
42 Id. at pages 171-172.
43 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 46 F. (2d) 1006 (D. C. S. D. Miss.
1931).
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upon coal which we will assume is 80 per cent of its traffic.
We will further assume that, after an investigation, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has fixed the rate to be charged on
this coal. This rate has remained in effect for a number of years
without complaint from any shipper. A tremendous amount
of tonnage has moved on said rate. The revenues de-
rived from said rate have been distributed in the payment
of dividends and interest on bonds; taxes have been paid;
betterments have been made. Can it be contended that the
Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to later on
declare that the rate was unlawful and unreasonable and
then require the carrier to make reparation on every single
shipment which moved on said rate? Such a condition would
result in chaos. The great transportation systems of this
country could not exist in such circumstances . . . . If the
carriers cannot use the revenues received from the charging
of a rate which the Interstate Commerce Commission has
declared to be reasonable and lawful, it is clear to this court
that it would result in chaos in the finances and credit of
the carriers and would likewise result in breaking down the
stability in rate structures which was one of the cardinal
reasons for the passing of the Interstate Commerce Act."
44
Though this was said with respect to rates under the federal
system, the reasoning of the court is equally applicable to "com-
mission-approved" rates under the state systems. Perhaps it
should be noted in passing that the actual conclusion reached by
the court in this federal case was reversed on the ground that
the rate in question was not "commission-approved' .4 5  But the
appellate court did not disagree with the lower court as to the
law applicable to commission-approved rates.
Since the New York case, but without citing it, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia has handed down an important
decision which, though not squarely adjudicating the point,
strongly supports the same sweeping conclusion as that reached
by the New York court.48  The bill of complaint in the West
Virginia case, decided in 1937, had a twofold purpose: (1) the
proper classification of the plaintiff under a certain tariff, and
(2) judgment for the amount charged in excess of the rate pre-
scribed in the tariff. In disposing of the complaint the court
cited the following provision from the West Virginia Code:
44 Id. at page 1009.
45 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
460Charleston Apartments Corp. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 118
W. Va. 694, 192 S. F:. 294 (1937).
9
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"Any person, firm or corporation claiming to be damaged
by any violation of this chapter by any public utility sub-
ject to the provisions of this chapter, may make complaint
to the Commission, as provided herein, and bring suit in his
own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such
public utility may be liable under this chapter in any cir-
cuit court having jurisdiction." 4 7
Apparently the court construed this statutory provision for
relief as applicable only to charges made in excess of the "legal"
as distinguished from "reasonable" rate. The court said, among
other things:
"Whether the amount paid by the plaintiff exceeds the
legal rate is purely a judicial question of which the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County has jurisdiction. The question
is concerned with the construction and applicability of the
prevailing tariff, and not the reasonableness of said tariff.
Clearly, the question is one of law which should be adjudi-
cated by the circuit court." 4" (Italics supplied.)
By reading out of the judicial investigation in this case the
problem of the retroactive unreasonableness of the charge, our
court has, in the light of the above-mentioned West Virginia cases,
which are cited and relied upon, apparently eliminated from
judicial inquiy the question of reparation with respect to filed
unconditional rates. This does not mean, of course, that there
can be no judicial review as to the reasonableness of such rates
with respect to the future. That, however, is a problem which
does not fall within the purview of this study and has deen dealt
with at some length by the wi'iter in previous issues of the
Quarterly.49
It would seem then that in West Virginia the Public Service
Commission now has unchallengeable supervision with respect to
the retroactive unreasonableness of a charge made by a public
utility-unchallengable, that is, if the fied rate is enforced ac-
cording to its tenor.5 Here, as in an increasing number of other
47W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 4, § 7.
4 Chareston Apartments Corp. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 118
AV. Va. 694, 192 S. E. 294 (1937).
49 See Hardman, Tire Extent of the Finality of Commissions' Rate Regl-
lations (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 111; of. Hardman, Judicial Review as a Be-
quirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681.
50 To be sure, the supervision of the Public Service Commission is subject
to judicial control in certain other respects. See e. g., Natural Gas Co. of W.
Va. v. Sommerville, 113 '. Va. 100, 166 S. E. 852 (1932); Charleston Apart-
ments Corp. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S. E.
294 (1937).
10
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situations, the traditional all-inclusive doctrine of the "supremacy
of law", namely, that one whose legally protected interest is in-
fringed has a right, ultimately, to have his claim determined by
a judicial tribunal,51 has yielded, apparently, to the neolegal in-
sistence that in certain fields, once within the domain of the courts,
the administrative control is complete and final.
(To be concluded.)
51 See DIEY, LAkw OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1931) 183 et seq.; LANDIS,
Tim ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1939) 123 et seq.; of. Brandeis, J., in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80
L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
11
Hardman: The Finality of the Filed Rate in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1943
